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THE INFLUENCE OF DISALLOWED PREACQUISITION
LOSSES ON THE RECOGNITION OF POSTACQUISITION
LOSSES UNDER SECTION 269
INTRODUCTION
Assume the following situation: L corporation has suffered substan-
tial losses in the operation of its business. A, after examining the corpo-
ration's status, decides there is a possibility of making the business
profitable. A then purchases control of L principally to obtain the bene-
fit of L's loss carryovers. But A also intends to make the business
profitable and, in order to bring this about, invests a substantial sum
of money in L. L, however, continues to incur losses. A then liquidates
L. In the example given here, it is assumed that the preacquisition
losses will be denied recognition under section 269.1 But will A be al-
lowed the benefit of the losses suffered after acquisition of L? In order
to answer this question, consideration will have to be given to section
269 as well as to the pertinent case law.
Section 269(a) 2 provides that a deduction or other tax benefit, un-
available but for the acquisition of controP of a corporation or its as-
1. I T. REV. CODE of 1954, S 269.
2. In General-If-
(1) any person or persons acquire, or acquired on or after October
8, 1940, directly or indirectly, control of a corporation, or
(2) any corporation acquires, or acquired on or after October 8,
1940, directly or indirectly, property of another corporation, not
controlled, directly or indirectly, immediately before such acquisi-
tion, by such acquiring corporation or its stockholders, the basis
of which property, in the hands of the acquiring corporation, is
determined by reference to the basis in the hands of the transferor
corporation,
and the principal purpose for which such acquisition was made is evasion
or avoidance of Federal income tax by securing the benefit of a deduc-
tion, credit, or other allowance which such person or corporation would
not otherwise enjoy, then the Secretary or his delegate may disallow such
deduction, credit, or other allowance. For purposes of paragraphs (1)
and (2), control means the ownership of stock possessing at least 50
percent of the total combined voting power of all classes of stock en-
titled to vote or at least 50 percent of the total value of shares of all
classes of stock of the corporation. INT. Rav. CODE of 1954, § 269(a).
3. "Control" is defined by § 269(a) to mean the ownership of stock possessing at
least fifty percent of the total combined voting power of all classes of stock en-
titled to vote or at least fifty percent of the total value of all classes of stock.
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sets, is to be disallowed if the acquisition had as its "principal purpose"
the avoidance of income tax by securing such tax benefit. Thus, not all
acquisitions resulting in tax savings are within the prohibitions of the
section.4 Section 269 is "operative only if the evasion or avoidance pur-
pose outranks, or exceeds in importance, any other one purpose." 5 Even
where there has been a tax avoidance purpose in the acquisition, sec-
tion 269(b) 6 still authorizes the allowance by the Commissioner of such
part of the deduction or other tax benefit as will not result in the tax
avoidance or evasion sought by the acquisition.7
The thesis of this discussion is that postacquisition losses should be
recognized unless such losses were built-in or were incidental to the
realization of the preacquisition losses where the obtaining of such
losses was for the principal purpose of tax avoidance. Before defining
what is meant by this, however, consideration will briefly be given to
the background of the section.
4. The test, according to the Senate Finance Committee, is:
... whether the transaction or a particular factor thereof 'distorts the
liability of the particular taxpayer' when the 'essential nature of the trans-
action or factor is examined in the light of the legislative plan which the
deduction or credit is intended to effectuate. S. REt. No. 627, 78th Cong.,
1st Sess. 58 (1943) reprinted at 1944 CuM. BuLm. 1017.
This explanation is now included in the Treasury Regulation and reads:
Characteristic of such circumstances are those in which the effect of the
deduction, credit, or other allowance would be to distort the liability of
the particular taxpayer when the essential nature of the transaction or
situation is examined in the light of the basic purpose or plan which the
deduction, credit, or other allowance was designed by Congress to ef-
fectuate. Treas. Reg. S 1.269-2(b) (1962).
5. 1944 Cum. BLL. 1017.
6. INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 269(b).
7. Power of Secretary or His Delegate to Allow Deduction, etc., in Part.-In any
case to which subsection (a) applies, the Secretary or his delegate is authorized-
(1) to allow as a deduction, credit, or allowance any part of any amount
disallowed by such subsection, if he determines that such allowance will
not result in the evasion or avoidance of Federal income tax for which the
acquisition was made; or
(2) to distribute, apportion, or allocate gross income, and distribute,
apportion, or allocate the deductions, credits, or allowances the benefit
of which was sought to be secured, between or among the corporations, or
properties, or parts thereof, involved, and to allow such deductions, credits,
or allowances so distributed, apportioned, or allocated, but to give effect to
such allowance only to such extent as he determines will not result in the
evasion or avoidance of Federal income tax for which the acquisition was
made; or
(3) to exercise his powers in part under paragraph (1) and in part
under paragraph (2). INT. REv. CoDE of 1954, S 269(b).
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HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF SEcTIoN 269
The predecessor of section 269, section 129 of the Internal Revenue
Code of 1939, was adopted in 1943. The World War II excess profits
tax had just been enacted with a resultant sharp increase in the corpo-
rate tax burden. This increase gave added impetus to the discovery of
new tax reduction schemes.8 One such tax avoidance device was the
acquisition of corporations or corporate property to obtain the benefit
of losses or deductions or a more favorable excess profits position. Con-
cerned with the loss of tax revenues in this critical war period, the
Treasury in 1943 sought congressional assistance in reducing this tax
avoidance. This request resulted in the passage of section 129 of the
Code.'0
At the time section 129 was adopted, there were other methods also
available for the control of tax evasion practices. Section 4511 was in
force, as were certain judicially-developed restraints. Moreover, some
of this case law was understood to have been included in section 129
as enacted.' - Indeed, the legislative history of the section clearly states
that congressional intent in passage of 129 was not to detract from
previously developed controls, 3 but to make more certain the law as
to the newer types of tax avoidance involving the acquisition of corpo-
rate control.'
4
The principal objectives of section 269, as stated in its legislative
history, are to prevent the reduction of tax liability through "distortion
8. See Rudick, Acquisitions to Avoid Income or Excess Profits Tax: Section 129 of
the Internal Revenue Code, 58 HARv. L. REv. 196 (1944); 7 MERTENS LAW OF FED-
EAL INcoME TAxATION at 190 (1967 rev.).
9. Thus, the New York Times of October 31, 1943, carried the following advertise-
ment: "For sale. Stock of corporation having 1943 tax loss deduction $120,000. Sole
assets are $80,000 in cash and equivalent." In the Wall Street Journal of July 15, 1943,
a similar advertisement appeared: 'Wanted. To acquire all the outstanding stock of
a corporation with original invested capital of several hundred thousand dollars with
present assets at nominal values." Rudick, supra note 8, at 196.
10. Now INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 269.
11. Now Ir. REv. CODE of 1954, § 482.
12. See S. REP. No. 627, 78th Cong., 1st Sess. 58 (1943) which declares that the:
• . . legal effect of the section is, in large, to codify and emphasize the
general principles set forth in Higgins v. Smith, 308 U.S. 473, and in
other judicial decisions, as to the ineffectiveness of arrangements distort-
ing or perverting deductions, credits, or allowances so that they no longer
bear a reasonable business relationship to the interests or enterprises which
produce them and for the benefit of which they were provided.
13. See 1944 CuM. BuLL. 1070.
14. Id. at 1017.
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or perversion effected through tax avoidance devices" 15 and to end
"any market for, or dealings in, interests in corporations or property
which have as their objectives the reduction through artifice of... tax
liability." 1 The aims of this section have specific reference to the
prohibition of dealings in loss corporations which, as stated before,x7
were in great demand after the passage of the excess profits tax. The
general legal effect of the section is to codify the policies of certain
judicial decisions18 which refused to recognize the utility of artifices
attempting to distort deductions and other tax benefits "so that they no
longer bear a reasonable business relationship to the interests or enter-
prises which produced them." "9
But section 269, it is to be emphasized, was not enacted to hinder
good faith business activities, but rather was to facilitate "bona fide
business transactions." 20 The section was based on a policy which con-
templated "the bona fide conduct of business in the ordinary way." 21
But how do these objectives and policies square with the decisions un-
der section 269 dealing with the treatment of postacquisition losses
where the principal purpose of the acquisition was tax avoidance or
evasion?
INFLUENCE OF DISALLOWED PREACQUISITION LOSSES ON RECOGNITION OF
POSTACQUISITION LossEs UNDER SECTION 269
Postacquisition losses suffered either by the acquirer or by the ac-
15. H.R. REP. No. 871, 78th Cong., Ist Sess. 49 (1943), reprinted in 1944 CuM. Buu.
938.
16. 1944 Cum. BULL. 938.
17. Rudick and MERTENS, supra note 8; see also n. 9, infra.
18. E.g., Higgins v. Smith, 308 U.S. 473 (1940). See 1944 CuM. BULL. 1016. The
Higgins rationale was as follows:
A taxpayer is free to adopt such organization of his affairs as he may
choose and having elected to do business as a corporation, he must ac-
cept the tax disadvantages. On the other hand, the Government may not
be required to acquiesce in the taxpayer's election of that form for doing
business which is most advantageous to him. The Government may look
at actualities and upon determination that the form employed for doing
business or carrying out the challenged tax event is unreal or a sham may
sustain or disregard the effect of the fiction as best serves the purposes
of the tax statute. To hold otherwise would permit the schemes of tax-
payers to supersede legislation in the determination of the time and manner
of taxation. 308 U.S. at 477-478.
19. 1944 CUM. BULL. 1016.
20. Id. at 1017.
21. Id.
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quired corporation 22 are usually deductible unless the corporation or
property was acquired for the principal purpose of tax avoidance.
Where there is such purpose, postacquisition losses have been denied
recognition in some cases23 and recognized in others.24 The cases deny-
ing recognition have generally relied upon section 269 as well as upon
case law holding that a corporate group formed "without a business
purpose" cannot file a consolidated return.25
Before examining this apparent divergency of view, the derivation of
postacquisition losses should be understood. These losses may originate
either in the sale of acquired property which has depreciated in value
or from postacquisition operating losses or from a combination of the
two. A loss on the sale of acquired property can result from a decline
in the value of such property either before or after acquisition. Where
the decrease in value has occurred prior to the acquisition, the loss is
properly described as built-in, while in the case of depreciation in value
22. At first section 129 (now section 269) was held not to apply to an acquired
corporation in any event. Aiprosa Watch Corp., 11 T.C. 240 (1948) (dictum).
Alprosa stated that: "That section [129] would seem to prohibit the use of a deduc-
tion, credit or allowance only by the acquiring person or corporation and not their
use by the corporation whose control was acquired." Id. at 245. See, for a full dis-
cussion of this issue, U. So. CAL. 1962 TAx INsr. 444. This "period of misconstruc-
tion" continued until 1957 when the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the
Tax Court on this point. Coastal Oil Storage Co. v. Commissioner, 242 F.2d 396 (4th
Cir. 1957), rev'g 25 T.C. 1304(1956). In 1960 the Tax Court acceded to this view in
Thomas E. Snyder Sons Co., 34 T.C. 400 (1960), stating that: ". . . we were in error.
... We now agree with that reasoning [of the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Cir-
cuit in Commissioner v. British Motor Car Distributors, Ltd., 278 F.2d 392 (9th Cir.
1960)1." Id. at 406, 407. In the latter case the court said: ". . . [T]he persons who have
acquired the corporation did so to secure for themselves a very real tax benefit to be
realized by them through the acquired corporation and which they could not other-
wise have realized." 278 F.2d at 394.
23. Luke v. Commissioner, 351 F.2d 568 (7th Cir. 1965); R. P. Collins & Co. v.
United States, 303 F.2d 142 (1st Cir. 1962); Elko Realty Co., 29 T.C. 1012, aff'd per
curiam, 260 F.2d 949 (3d Cir. 1958). For a discussion of these decisions see Adlman,
Recent Cases Increasingly Extend Section 269 to Disallow Post-Acquisition Operating
Losses, 17 J. TAXATION 282 (1962); Note, Section 269 of the Internal Revenue Code and
the Status of Postacquisition Losses, 33 U. CHI. L. REv. 577 (1966).
24. Herculite Protective Fabrics Corp. v. Commissioner, 387 F.2d 475 (3d Cir. 1968)
rev'g in part T.C. Memo. 1966-277 and Zanesville Investment Co. v. Commissioner, 335
F.2d 507 (6th Cir. 1964), rev'g 38 T.C. 406 (1962).
25. Sections 1501-1505, the provisions of the Code relating to the filing of consoli-
dated returns, basically require that a group of corporations be affiliated in a parent-
subsidiary relationship for the filing of such return. INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 1504(a).
Since, in the cases here under discussion, the acquisitions were usually made through
the corporation's obtaining control of, rather than the assets of, another corporation,
deductions generally could only be had by filing consolidated returns.
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of the assets after acquisition or in the case of postacquisition operat-
ing losses, this is not an accurate description, at least in an economic
sense. If the loss is of the "built-in variety," there is no reason why
section 269 should not operate to disallow it, if the acquisition was
made for the principal purpose 6 of tax avoidance. However, the tax
benefit has been denied not only in such cases as this, but also where
the losses were incurred in an economic sense after the acquisition,
principally on the basis that such losses were tainted by the tax avoid-
ance purpose in the acquisition.
CONSIDERATION OF CASES DENYING RECOGNITION TO POSTACQUISITION
LoSSES-PREACQUISlIoN Loss TAINT
Although no postacquisition losses were involved in J. D. & A. B.
Spreckels Co.,28 this is a leading theory case which must be considered
in any discussion of postacquisition losses. Spreckels set forth the re-
quirement that a business purpose29 underlie the acquisition of a corpo-
ration for it to be included in a group of affiliated corporations entitled
to file consolidated returns.3 0 Since the acquisition in the cases to be
considered were made by one corporation acquiring control, rather
than all the assets, of another corporation, only by the filing of con-
solidated returns3' could deductions for current losses have been ef-
fected. In a decision which did involve postacquisition losses, Elko
Realty Co., this business purpose rationale was imposed as a require-
26. According to Treas. Reg. § 1.269-3 (a) (2) if the purpose to evade or avoid Fed-
eral income tax exceeds in importance any other purpose, it is the principal purpose.
27. E.g., R. P. Collins & Co. v. United States, 303 F.2d 142 (lst Cir. 1962).
28. 41 B.T.A. 370 (1940). The facts briefly stated are as follows: The parent corpo-
ration of an affiliated group of corporations acquired all the stock of A corporation.
No business purpose was shown for the acquisition. Held: A corporation was not a
member of the affiliated group of corporations for the purpose of section 141 of the
Revenue Act of 1932.
29. For a definition of the business purpose doctrine, see B. BITrrt & J. EusnIca,
FEDERAL INcoMn TAXATION OF CORPORATIONS AND SHAREHOLDERS, 451-454 (2d ed. 1967).
The leading case is Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 465 (1935).
30. The Court in Spreckels stated that:
It is apparent that the privilege [of filing consolidated returns] was granted
in order that the tax liability of a group of corporations which were com-
bined for business purposes into one business unit might be based upon
the true net income of the business unit.... It is believed that they [the
framers of the statute] did not intend that the privilege be enjoyed . . .
where the affiliation relied upon as the basis for the privilege to make a
consolidated return is without a business purpose. 41 B.T.A. at 375.
31. See note 25, supra.
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ment in addition to those of section 269.32 In Elko Realty, the taxpayer
corporation acquired all the stock of two corporations which were
operating at a loss at the time of their acquisition and which continued
to operate at a loss. When taxpayer purchased the stock it apparently
knew nothing of the financial performance of the business.33 Taxpayer
filed consolidated returns with the two corporations for the years 1951-
1953 and deducted from the taxpayer's income the postacquisition
operating losses of the business. The Commissioner disallowed the de-
duction of the losses of the two acquired corporations. The Tax Court
agreed on the ground that taxpayer had failed to show under section
129 (now 269) that the principal purpose of the acquisitions was not
the evasion or avoidance of Federal income tax and further that tax-
payer had failed to show that the acquisition had a bona fide business
purpose, other than tax avoidance, and thus the acquired corporations
were not affiliates within the meaning of section 141 of the 1939
Code. 4 In Elko Realty, however, no distinction was made between
those losses incurred before and after acquisition.3 5 Both were simply
disallowed on the ground that no business purpose, other than tax re-
duction, was shown for the acquisition, citing Spreckels"6 and section
129 (now 269).11
The leading case specifically denying recognition to postacquisition
losses is R. P. Collins & Co. v. United States.35 The taxpayer, a corpo-
ration engaged in selling wool, purchased a controlling interest with
an option to buy the rest of the outstanding stock in Priscilla Woolen
Mills, which manufactured worsted yarn. Priscilla had been operating
at a loss and thus the stock purchase price was less than the tax basis
of the assets. Taxpayer exercised the option and, as Priscilla continued
to operate at a loss, decided to terminate its operation. The plant and
equipment were sold but Priscilla was not insolvent. Some months
after the sale, Priscilla became engaged in the business of selling wool
32. Elko Realty Co., 29 T.C. 1012, aff'd per curiam, 260 F.2d 949 (3d Cir. 1958).
33. 29 T.C. 1012, 1014.
34. In support of this proposition the Tax Court cited J. D. & A. B. Spreckels Co.,
41 B.T.A. 370 (1940) which set down the rule that where the ownership of a sub-
sidiary's stock by a parent corporation is without a business purpose other than a tax
reducing one, the subsidiary is not an affiliate within the intent of section 141. No
postacquisition losses were involved in Spreckels. Thus Elko Realty would seem to
extend this rule to postacquisition losses also.
35. 29 T.C. at 1026.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. 303 F.2d 142 (1st Cir. 1962).
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-the same line of business as taxpayer. The taxpayer filed a consoli-
dated return39 with Priscilla in which the postaffiliation operating
losses and the loss on the sale of the plant and equipment were deducted
in full against consolidated income. The following year the taxpayer
deducted as a carryover the unused postacquisition losses as well as
some preacquisition net operating loss carryovers. The Commissioner
denied all these deductions on the ground that the principal purpose
for the acquisition of Priscilla was tax avoidance. The district court
upheld the Commissioner's determination. 40 On appeal, the taxpayer
did not contest the lower court's disallowance of Priscilla's preacquisi-
tion losses but argued that it should be permitted to deduct the losses
economically suffered after the acquisition regardless of the purpose
for the acquisition. Taxpayer reasoned that since a loss is worth at most
only 52 percent of its amount, no one would have a primary purpose
of losing one dollar to save at most fifty-two cents in taxes. But the
First Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the result obtained in the dis-
trict court, stating:
We find this argument unpersuasive. . . . [I]t unrealistically
attempts to segregate into isolated segments a course of conduct
which is essentially unitary both in conception and in impact.
Assuming . . . that the court could conclude that the "overall"
purpose of the acquisition was to avoid taxes ... then we believe
that it must have been within the fair contemplation of the tax-
payer that certain operating losses would necessarily be incurred
before the ultimate purpose could be effectuated and, to that ex-
tent, the operating losses would be included as a necessary inci-
dent of the "overall purpose." In effect once it is conceded that
Priscilla was acquired with a view toward obtaining the tax ad-
vantages stemming from a corporate dismemberment, then we
believe that all the losses which immediately precede this ultimate
act are constituent elements of a course of conduct prescribed by
Section 129. They are tarred by the same brush.41
Thus the appellate court, once the tax avoidance purpose was found,
refused to fragment the losses. The result reached was objected to in a
39. Taxpayer could only file a consolidated return after exercising the option as
section 141 of the 1939 Code (now INT. REv. CODE of 1954, §§ 1501-1505) required 95%
stock ownership.
40. Collins v. United States, 193 F. Supp. 602 (D.C. Mass. 1961).
41. R. P. Collins & Co. v. United States, 303 F.2d 142, 146 (1st Cit. 1962).
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strong dissent by Judge Aldrich, who said that the majority misin-
terpreted the statute "carrying on . . . the penalty notion ... ." 4 In
Judge Aldrich's view, the statute should be applied only to "allowances
artificial to the taxpayer, not [to] losses actually incurred by it." 4' In
other words the dissent would only have disallowed built-in losses.
The Collins rationale was followed in Brick Milling Co.44 There two
brothers acquired control of a corporation in the manufacture and
sale of ice. They then transferred their stock to taxpayer corporation
of which they were the sole stockholders. Brick Milling then liquidated
the acquired corporation and received a distribution of its assets. Tax-
payer claimed as deductions both the net operating loss carryovers as
well as the postacquisition operating expenses of the ice business. The
Tax Court denied the deduction on the basis that section 269 applies
to postacquisition as well as preacquisition losses where the principal
purpose of the acquisition was the evasion or avoidance of taxes by
securing the benefit of these losses.45 In support of its position, the Tax
Court cited Collins46 and Treas. Reg. § 1.269-3 (b) (1).4
In the more recent case of Luke v. Commissioner,48 the postacquisi-
tion losses were again denied recognition, the Court again citing Col-
lihs.49 In Luke, Arlington (taxpayer) had sustained heavy losses. Its
42. Id. at 148, 149.
43. Id. at 149. In support of this statement Judge Aldrich cited the legislative his-
tory of section 129. The aim of the section was to prevent "reduction through arti-
fice" of tax liability. H.R. REP. No. 871, 78th Cong., 1st Sess. 49 (1943).
44. Brick Milling Co., 63, 305 P-H Memo. T.C. (1963).
45. Id.
46. 303 F.2d 142 (1st Cir. 1962).
47. Treas. Reg. § 1.269-3(b) (1) provides in part:
(b) Acquisition of control; transactions indicative of purpose to evade
or avoid tax. If the requisite acquisition of control within the meaning
of paragraph (1) of section 269(a) exists, the transactions set forth in the
following subparagraphs are among those which, in the absence of addi-
tional evidence to the contrary, ordinarily are indicative that the principal
purpose for acquiring control was evasion or avoidance of Federal in-
come tax:
(1) A corporation or other business enterprise (or the interest con-
trolling such corporation or enterprise) with large profits acquires control
of a corporation with current, past, or prospective credits, deductions, net
operating losses, or other allowances and the acquisition is followed by
such transfers or other action as is necessary to bring the deduction, credit,
or other allowance into conjunction with the income (see further §
1.269-6). ...
48. 351 F.2d 568 (7th Cir. 1965).
49. Id. at 572.
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stock was worthless and its principal "asset" was its unused net operat-
ing loss of approximately $390,000. The Conant Group acquired con-
trol of Arlington in 1956. In 1958 the latter acquired the assets of two
Conant-controlled corporations which had undivided profits of almost
$1,500,000. Prior to its acquisition by Conant, Arlington had obtained
a franchise to manufacture a trailer hitch but had not yet begun to
make the product. Arlington hoped to realize profits therefrom but
the actual operations of Arlington during the postacquisition period re-
sulted in substantial losses. Taxpayer claimed both the preacquisition
and postacquisition losses. Both were denied but as to the postacquisition
losses the court said:
To advance any claim to the substantial pre-acquisition net operat-
ing loss carryovers it was essential that the Conant group give
Arlington at least the appearance of being alive . . . to comply
with the requirements of Section 382 of the code ... and a post-
acquisition loss, which occurred, was expected in the attempt to
manufacture and sell the new product. The objective of Section
269 "is to prevent ... acquiring corporations with current, past
or prospective losses. . . ." And, the rationale of ... Collins ... is
applicable here.50
From these cases, it is apparent that postacquisition losses have been
denied recognition both on the basis of Collins and its "taint" rationale"'
and on the basis that no business purpose was shown for the acquisi-
tion.52 But before considering these cases and the underlying rationale
further, it is advisable to examine a few of the numerous cases which
have allowed the deduction of postacquisition losses.
CONSIDERATION OF CASES ALLOWING RECOGNITION TO POSTACQUISITION
LossEs-TRuE EcoNoMIc Loss THEORY
Although section 129 (now 269) has been applicable to loss corpo-
50. Id.
51. See also Temple Square Mfg. Co., 36 T.C. 88 (1961); American Pipe & Steel
Corp. v. Commissioner, 243 F.2d 125 (9th Cir. 1957), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 906 (1957);
and J. D. & A. B. Spreckels Co., 41 B.TA. 370 (1940). These decisions generally dis-
allowed the use of postacquisition losses which were built-in at the time of the § 269
acquisition. For similar provisions under the consolidated returns regulations see Treas.
Reg. § 1.1502-31A(b) (9). As stated above, however, Brick Milling Co., 63,305 P-H
Memo T.C., held, relying on Collins, that § 269 applied to disallow postacquisition
operating losses.
52. See notes 28, 29 and 30, supra, and the accompanying text.
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rations since 1943, prior to 1955 only two cases concerning loss corpo-
rations were decided and neither involved postacquisition losses.5 But
then Elko and Collins were handed down and it seemed that postacqui-
sition losses would be disallowed whether they were built-in or whether
they were true economic losses whenever there was a principal pur-
pose of tax avoidance or evasion in the acquisition. This was true until
1964 when Zanesville Investment Co. v. Commissioner54 was decided.
In Zanesville, one Jones owned all the stock of taxpayer corporation
which had a successful newspaper publishing subsidiary with which it
had been filing consolidated returns for a number of years. Jones also
owned most of the stock of Muskingum Coal Company. Muskingum
had suffered substantial operating losses for several years. During 1954
taxpayer loaned the coal company a substantial amount in the hope
that by investing in new equipment Muskingum would return a profit.
Because of the new method of mining coal to be used, however, it was
anticipated that Muskingum would continue to sustain operating losses
for some time. Therefore, in 1955 Jones transferred all his stock in
the coal company to taxpayer. Thus Muskingum became a member of
the consolidated group and eligible to file a consolidated return, there-
by hopefully making it possible for its anticipated losses to be deducted
from the income of the rest of the group. The coal company continued
to operate at a loss until 1956 when it sold its property at a further
loss and filed a petition in bankruptcy. The Tax Court"' disallowed a de-
duction for the postacquisition losses, both operating and capital, citing
case authority 0 holding that where a commonly-owned affiliated group
of corporations acquires a loss corporation in order to use such loss
corporation's postacquisition losses on the consolidated return to offset
the earnings of that affiliated group, either section 269 or sections 1501
to 1505 (the consolidated return provisions) may be used to disallow
the utilization of such losses.5 The Sixth Circuit reversed, stating:
53. See Feder, The Application of Section 269 to Corporations Having Net Operat-
ing Loss Carryovers and Potential Losses, N.Y.U. 21st INST. ON FED. TAx. 1284 (1963).
These cases were Alprosa Watch Corp., 11 T.C. 240 (1948) and WAGE, Inc., 19 T.C.
249 (1952).
54. 335 F.2d 507 (6th Cir. 1964).
55. Zanesville Investment Co., 38 T.C. 406 (1962).
56. R. P. Collins & Co. v. United States, 303 F.2d 142 (1st Cit. 1962); Elko Realty
Co. v. Commissioner, 260 F.2d 949 (3d Cir. 1958); as well as reference to J. D. & A. B.
Spreckels Co., 41 B.T.A. 370 (1940).
57. Zanesville Investment Co., 38 T. C. 406 at 414 (1962).
1968]
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Until this case, the Commissioner made no attempt in the ap-
proximately twenty years since enactment of Section 129 (now
Section 269), so far as the reported cases indicate, to deny a tax-
payer the right to offset an out-of-pocket dollar loss incurred after
affiliation with post-affiliation income. We do not believe Section
269 requires such a result.58
The appellate court conceded that section 269 prohibited the acquiring
of corporations in order to utilize their tax losses or the built-in, but
as yet unrealized, losses or other tax benefits of such corporations, but
held that section 269 did not apply to the use of post-affiliation losses
against post-affiliation consolidated income. The court distinguished
Spreckels,59 Elko,60 and Collins"' on the ground that all these cases in-
volved the recognition of losses which, in an economic sense, had been
incurred prior to affiliation.62 Spreckels was cited for the proposition
that pre-affiliation losses cannot be utilized against the income of other
members of the new affiliated group,83 rather than for the proposition
that the affiliation must serve a business purpose or consolidated re-
turns will not be allowed,64 which would include postacquisition as
well as preacquisition losses. Elko Realty was distinguished on the
ground that the losses there represented preacquisition depreciation of
assets. No mention was made in Zanesville of the postacquisition operat-
ing losses in Elko or of the proposition that where no business purpose
other than tax avoidance is shown, the acquired corporation will not be
recognized as affiliated within the meaning of section 141 of the 1939
Code.8 5 This proposition, as stated above in reference to Spreckels,
would include postacquisition as well as preacquisition losses and the
court in Elko Realty so held . 6 Collins was disposed of as merely repre-
senting the view that as the primary purpose of the acquisition was the
obtaining of the built-in loss, and as this was within the proscription
of section 269, this purpose tainted the postacquisition losses and thus
all were disallowed. The court assumed that postaffiliation operating
58. Zanesvifle Investment Co. v. Commissioner, 335 F.2d 507, 509-510 (6th Cir.
1964).
59. 41 B.T.A. 370 (1940).
60. 260 F.2d 949 (3d Cir. 1958).
61. 303 F.2d 142 (1st Cir. 1962).
62. Zanesville Investment Co. v. Commissioner, 335 F.2d 507, 510 (6th Cir. 1964).
63. Id. at 511.
64. See note 30, supra.
65. See note 28, supra.
66. 260 F.2d 949 (3d Cir. 1958).
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losses standing by themselves would have been allowed.67 This may be
a proper interpretation of Collins, but it would seem that its implica-
tions are broader and that all postacquisition losses would be included
where the principal purpose of the acquisition was tax avoidance and
Collins had been so interpreted.68
Thus it is evident that Zanesville may be reconciled with case law
denying recognition to postacquisition losses. However, there can be
no reconciliation of that case law with Herculite Protective Fabrics
Corp. v. Co~rmissioner.6 In Herculite, one Sidney Hyman purchased
all the stock of taxpayer corporation in May of 1960, after the latter
had suffered gubstantial losses for several years. The facts established
a statutory presumption under section 269(c) that "the principal pur-
pose" of the acquisition was "the evasion or avoidance of Federal in-
come tax." 7o Hyman operated taxpayer at a loss until January, 1961,
when a profitable Hyman-controlled corporation was acquired by tax-
payer. The tax return for 1961 claimed both preacquisition and post-
acquisition operating loss deductions. The Commissioner disallowed the
claim in its entirety as being contrary to the provisions of both section
269 and section 382. The Tax Court sustained the Commissioner under
section 269 but did not pass upon the application of section 382. The
Third Circuit upheld the Tax Court's disallowance of the preacquisition
losses but reversed the court's holding on those sustained after acquisi-
tion. The decision cited with approval the dissenting opinion of Judge
(now Chief Judge) Aldrich in the Collins case, which reasoned that
disallowance of postacquisition losses constitutes a penalty that should
67. 335 F.2d 507 (6th Cir. 1964).
68. Brick Milling Co., 63,305 P-H Memo. T.C. (1963).
69. 387 F.2d 475 (3d Cir. 1968) rev'g in part 66,277 P-H Memo. T.C. (T.C. Memo.
1966-277).
70. INT. REv. CoDE of 1954, § 269(c) provides:
(c) Presumption in Case of Disproportionate Purchase Price.-The fact
that the consideration paid upon an acquisition by any person or corpo-
ration described in subsection (a) is substantially disproportionate to the
aggregate-
(1) of the adjusted basis of the property of the corporation (to the
extent attributable to the interest acquired specified in paragraph
(1) of subsection (a)), or of the property acquired specified in
paragraph (2) of subsection (a); and (2) of the tax benefits (to
the extent not reflected in the adjusted basis of the property) not
available to such person or corporation otherwise than as a result
of such acquisition, shall be prima facie evidence of the principal
purpose of evasion or avoidance of the Federal income tax. ...
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not be imposed without a clear legislative mandate.7 ' The Third Cir-
CUit7 2 emphasized the fact that such postacquisition losses would be
clearly deductible by way of carryover had not losses suffered before
acquisition been claimed. Herculite concluded:
Thus, their [postacquisition loss] deduction is in no sense arti-
ficial and represents no unjust enrichment of the taxpayer ...
We conclude, therefore, that section 269 does not preclude the
claimed post-acquisition loss deduction. 73
The dissent would have upheld the Tax Court on the grgund that the
situation should be viewed as an entirety and as Hyman's acquisition
of the assets was a vital part of the plan to secure the benefit of tax-
payer's losses, all losses, including those incurred after taxpayer was
acquired by Hyman but before the acquisition of the profit-making
assets, should be disallowed.74 It should be noted that the case was re-
manded to the Tax Court for consideration of the Commissioner's con-
tention that the postacquisition losses should be disallowed under sec-
tion 382 in any event.7 5
The result in Zanesville and Herculite is apparently based upon a
true economic loss theory. If the loss has actually been incurred by the
one claiming it, section 269 should not be used to deny the deduction
claimed. These cases would not disallow postacquisition losses merely
because of a tax avoidance purpose in the acquisition of control of a
corporation or its assets. To be disallowed, the losses must have been
built-in, i.e., losses incurred in an economic sense prior to the acqui-
sition. Taint is a theory incompatible with the view of these decisions.
This is more true of Herculite than Zanesville. Whereas Zanesville
may perhaps be reconciled, Herculite explicitly rejects the majority
view in Collins.
AN ARGUMENT FOR RECONSIDERATION OF SECTION 269
AND ITS CASE LAW
The cases denying recognition to postacquisition losses have generally
done so on the ground that (1) the loss was built-in, or (2) there




74. Id. at 476, 477.
75. Id. at 476.
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was no business purpose for the acquisition other than tax reduction,
or (3) the tax avoidance purpose for the acquisition tainted the al-
lowance of the postacquisition losses. The decisions are generally in
accord that if the losses are built-in, they are within the proscription
of section 269. This would seem to accord with the realities of the
situation in that such losses are actually accrued, in an economic sense,
before acquisition and thus are to be treated as any other preacquisi-
tion loss. To superimpose a business purpose test on section 269 might
seem to accord with the legislative history of the section." But even
that is arguable as to postacquisition losses, since the same entity which
produced the loss is now claiming it and since section 269 was aimed
only at those "arrangements distorting or perverting deductions . ..
so that they no longer bear a reasonable business relationship to the in-
terests or enterprises which produced them. . .. ,, 77 This rationale ap-
pears unsound as to postacquisition losses since under the existing corpo-
rate income tax each dollar of loss would create a tax savings of only
forty-eight cents.78
Perhaps some would contend, however, that while no one would in-
tend to spend one dollar to save forty-eight cents, the principal pur-
pose was to secure the tax benefits of the preacquisition losses and that
all the deductions relating to the realization of such benefits should be
disallowed to deter such tax avoidance purposes. This seemingly was
the rationale of the cases holding that the preacquisition losses tainted
those incurred after acquisition and thus both should be disallowed.
The Collins court, for example, viewed the entire course of conduct as
essentially unitary and held that "all the losses which immediately pre-
cede this ultimate act [of termination of the corporation's existence]
are constituent elements of a course of conduct proscribed by Section
129. They are tarred by the same brush." 9 But this view goes too far.
The purpose of section 269 is not to disallow automatically the entire
claimed deduction, but only so much of it as results in tax avoidance.8 0
The Commissioner is specifically empowered to allow such part of the
deduction as will not result in tax avoidance.8 '
This is not to say that postacquisition losses other than those that
76. See S. REP. No. 627, supra note 12.
77. 1944 CuM. BuLL. 1016.
78. INmr. REv. CODE of 1954, § 11.
79. R. P. Collins & Co. v. United States, 303 F.2d 142, 146 (1st Cir. 1962).
80. See notes 2 and 4, supra.
81. See note 7, supra.
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are built-in should always and invariably be recognized. If the corpo-
ration was acquired with the principal purpose of tax avoidance and if
the preacquisition losses could only be realized by the retention of the
corporation for a time, and during this time after-acquisition losses
were incurred, such postacquisition losses should be disallowed as being
incidental to the realization of the tax benefit for the purpose of which
the corporation was acquired. But where postacquisition losses were
incurred in a bona fide attempt to rehabilitate the corporation, such
losses should be recognized. In many instances it may be difficult to
determine whether or not the postacquisition loss was merely incidental
to obtaining the tax benefit of the preacquisition loss, but an attempt
should be made. Such factors as the making of substantial investments
in the business during the postacquisition period, bona fide attempts to
obtain loans for revitalizing the business, and revamping the com-
pany should be recognized in making this determination. s2 It must be
remembered that section 269 should not operate to hinder bona fide
business transactions. Indeed, its aim was to assist them. 3 This would
also seem to encourage rehabilitation 4 of unprofitable corporations
which is certainly a desirable social and business objective.
As noted above, two of the more recent cases in this area recognized
postacquisition losses. While Zanesvilles5 attempted to reconcile its hold-
ing with Collins and other decisions disallowing postacquisition loss de-
ductions, it apparently stands for the proposition that only those future
losses which are built-in and accrued in the economic sense at the time
of the acquisition come within the proscription of section 269. Hercu-
82. Two examples follow. One depicts a situation where the postacquisition losses
should be denied recognition. The other should yield a contrary result.
Example (1). L Corporation was acquired by A in the hope of obtaining the bene-
fit of L's large preacquisition losses. But in order to utilize these losses, A had to
operate the corporation for a time after the acquisition to make the acquisition appear
to have a business purpose behind it other than tax avoidance. Such postacquisition
losses are incidental to the realization of the preacquisition losses and should not be
allowed.
Example (2). L Corporation was acquired by A. L had suffered large preacquisition
losses and this was the principal purpose for its acquisition by A. However, A also
believed that L had potentiality and could be made a profit-producing corporation.
In this belief A expended substantial sums in renovation. But the corporation still
operated at a loss and so A sold it. Here the postacquisition losses were not inci-
dental to the realization of the preacquisition losses and should be allowed.
83. See 1944 CUM. BULL., supra note 20 and accompanying text.
84. See 78 HARV. L. REv. 1479 (1965).
85. Zanesville Investment Co. v. Commissioner, 335 F.2d 507 (6th Cir. 1964).
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lite86 clearly stands for this proposition and rejects the taint rationale
of the Collins decision. It appears that both were correctly decided in
light of their respective factual patterns. The taint rationale of Collins
should be rejected. However, as stated above, those postacquisition
losses which are incidental to the realization of the preacquisition loss
deductions should be denied recognition. The trend of the recent cases
seems to be toward the Zanesville-Herculite result. However, the ra-
tionale of Collins and Elko is by no means dead as the Luke decision
shows.
CONCLUSION
Neither the Collins nor the Herculite line of cases is entirely er-
roneous. While postacquisition losses should not be automatically dis-
allowed, as Collins would seemingly do, tax avoidance should not be
permitted. Collins goes too far and thus violates the intent of section
269. Conversely, Zanesville and more especially Herculite would ap-
parently recognize any postacquisition loss not built-in. This also over-
steps the apparent intent of section 269, for if the postacquisition loss
was incurred in order that the tax benefit might be derived from the
preacquisition loss, this is as much a part of the tax avoidance scheme
as the obtaining of the preacquisition loss and should not be permitted.
Rather each transaction should be closely examined to see whether the
postacquisition losses were merely incidental to the realization of the
tax benefit for the purpose of which the acquisition was made. If so,
they should be disallowed. Otherwise such loss deductions should be
recognized. This would seemingly more accord with the underlying
policy of section 269 not to hinder the bona fide conduct of business
than either of the present lines of decisions.
HOMER L. ELLiorr
86. Herculite Protective Fabrics Corp. v. Commissioner, 387 F.2d 475 (3d Cir. 1968).
1968]
